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The objective of the accelerated age life test program was to establish the deterioration characteristics of
crew escape system pyrotechnic components loaded with hexanitrostilbene (HNS)---such as shielded mild
detonating cord (SMDC), flexible confined detonating cord (FCDC), linear shaped charge (LSC), mild
detonating fuse (MDF), and through-bulkhead initiators (TBIs)--when exposed to elevated temperatures
for prolonged periods of time. Using the accelerated age test results coupled with observed performance on
hardware removed from flight vehicles and ground storage, we can make estimates of useful life for
hardware in the field. The principal elements of this study consist of components loaded with the explosive
HNS-I and HNS-II. Specifically, 6-grains/foot silver-sheathed MDF, 8-grains/foot silver-sheathed MDF,
20-grains/foot aluminum-sheathed LSC, 18.52-grains/foot aluminum-sheathed MDF, and 2.5-grains/foot
lead-sheathed FCDC were included in this test program. The FCDC, 18.52-grains/foot MDF, and
20-grains/foot LSC are the three components currently being used on the Space Shuttle, but the results
from all the hardware are, in general, applicable to the Space Shuttle hardware loaded with HNS.
Determination of service life limits is dependent upon the test results and the application environments
unique to installations within the Shuttle. The test program was complemented by a literature search for
age life studies of similar hardware conducted by NASA and other government organizations.
1.1 Literature Search
A literature search of pyrotechnic component age life extension test methods and results was performed and
the articles and specifications provided various means of assessing the useful life of pyrotechnic hardware.
The military specification MIL-STD-1576 dated July 1984,1 provides requirements for performing an
accelerated age life test on pyrotechnic devices. Table IV, EED Accelerated Aging Test., in MIL-STD-
1576 describes the test methodology for proving the hardware has a 3-year service life. The testing
requires that 10 units be subjected to the following, in the order shown:
1. non-destructive tests










Successfulcompletionof the testing allows a 3-year service life to be assigned to the hardware with an
indefinite number of extensions allowed on 3-year intervals. The technical basis for assigning and/or
extending the pyrotechnic device service life for 3 years is described in a paper by Moses, 2 which presents
the hypothesis that ambient temperature degradation of explosive materials can be accelerated through
exposure to elevated temperature. An Arrhenius rate equation is used to describe the chemical reactions
within the pyrotechnic device explosive. The Arrhenius equation is used to describe numerous chemical
reactions and has the form
k=A*exp(-E/R*T) (1)
which allows the computation of the reaction rate, k, units (1/time), of a chemical process, where
A = frequency factor ( 1/time)
E = activation energy (kcal/mole)
R = universal gas constant (liter-atmospheres/K/mole)
T = absolute temperature.
As related to the age life extension, Moses 2recommended a minimum of 13 samples be subjected to a given
set of time-temperature combinations. Data developed during destructive firings were to be compared with
previous firing data for the samples und¢ study. Extrapolation of a useful life using equation (1)
according to Moses 2 requires an estimate ,,f the average expected storage or use temperature of the
hardware along with the assumption that the chemical reaction rate doubles for every 10°C increase in
temperature. Table 12 presents predicted life versus accelerated-age test parameters and is presented below
for clarity of discussion. It should be remembered that Table 1 was generated using the above assumptions
regarding reaction rate. The confidence levels for each prediction are shown.
Table 1"
Estimated Life As Related To 28-Day Test Temperature
70°F Avg. 70°F Avg. 90°F Avg. 90°F Avg.
Storage Storage Storage Storage
Temperature Temperature Temperature Temperature
28-Day Test
Temperature 90% Confidence 80% Confidence 90% Confidence 80% Confidence
130°F 18,100 Hr 22,800 Hr 6,050 Hr 7,100 Hr
140°F 31,600 Hr 41,600 Hr 11,3t_) Hr 12,800 Hr
150°F 54,400 Hr 75,300 Hr 18,100 Hr 22,800 Hr
160°F 94,000 Hr 134,000 Hr 31,600 Hr 41,600 Hr
170°F 163,000 Hr 242,000 Hr 54,400 Hr 75,000 Hr









for designlife verificationwhichentailssubjecting5 samplesfromalot toenvironmentsanddestructive
tests4and7yearsfromthesubjectlot's destructivelotacceptancet st.3Datadevelopeduringthetests
areexaminedandcomparedwithpreviouslydevelopedataforevidenceofperformancedeterioration.








A total of 91 SMDC lines were tested as reported in reference 4, and the majority of SMDC lines had a
total age of approximately 99 months and an installed duration of approximately 49 months. Aging trends
for the SMDC lines were computed for total age while installed time trends were not computed due to
insufficient data. The SMDC lines contained HNS but the sheath material was not identified in the report.
The Navy performed an assessment of age-related deterioration of silver-sheathed-HNS FCDC used in the
Air Force A-7K aircraft 5 with the resulting recommendation that the useful and service life be limited to 5
and 3 years, respectively. Total age and installed times for the 15 FCDCs used in the testing were
approximately 35 and 24 months, respectively. Ballistic data were acceptable, although one FCDC had a
hairline crack in the sheath which was believed to extend into the explosive core. The Air Force data were
limited both in quantity of samples and installed and total age of the components. Combining data from
earlier tests performed on similar lines removed from a Navy version of the A-7K aircraft, more meaningful
useful and service life assessments were performed. The Navy noted failures to detonate along the entire
cord during the earlier tests. Based upon the 6 failures to propagate detonation along the entire FCDC with
total age and installed times of 52 months and 37 to 42 months, respectively, the total and service life limits
were recommended to remain at 60 and 36 months, respectively. The report conclusion postulated that a
contributor to the installed life limit in the A-7K aircraft FCDC was the number of bending cycles
experienced during canopy opening/closing. The report recommended that consideration be given to
counting the number of open/close cycles for the canopies as part of the FCDC service life surveillance.
Evaluation of the service and total life limits of the Harpoon Missile lead-sheathed-HNS FCDC and silver-
sheathed-HNS SMDC in C. A. Pfleegor's, "Surveillance: Navy Fleet-Returned Harpoon Missile Capsule
Detonator, SMDC, and FCDC ''6 resulted in an assignment of a total service life of 7½ years for both
components. A total of 23 SMDCs and 9 FCDCs were tested with total ages of 54 to 60 months and 57 to










TheNavyperformedanevaluationoftheservicelifeof S-3 canopy/hatch severance systems as discussed
in C.M. Nugent's, "Service Life Evaluation Program (SLEP) for S-3 Aircraft Canopy/Hatch Severance
System Explosive Actuated Devices, Phases III and IV," which involved testing hardware in the as-received
condition and also following accelerated aging. 7 Accelerated aging of the SMDC and FCDC consisted of
subjecting samples to temperature and humidity cycling, shock, and vibration environments in accordance
with MIL-D-21625D. The sample ages were
Total Life Installed Life
SMDC 80-131 months 32-72 months
FCDC 76-100 months 32-72 months
Temperature extremes in the temperature cycling were from -65°F to + 160°F, with additional storage time
at -80°F. Total time at -80°F was 134 hours; total time at -65°F was 54 hours; and total time at + 160°F
was 384 hours. SMDC and FCDC samples underwent visual inspection; radiographic inspection; ballistic
testing; and chemical analysis. The chemical analysis performed consisted of high-performance liquid
chromatography (HPLC) and differential scanning calorimetry. The combined tests resulted in the
following life assignments:
Total-Life Limit Service-Life Limit
silver-sheathed HNS SMDC*
lead-sheathed HNS FCDC
10 years 8 years
9 years 6 years
*SMDC samples used in the testing 7 had not reached the established total and
service life limits of 10 and 8 years, so the limits were not extended.
Ballistic test results 7 indicated the SMDC mean detonation velocity total aging trend would exceed the
maximum 7,000 meters/second limit at 140 and 170 months for -65°F and +200°F firing temperatures,
respectively. No trends were computed for the FCDC due to the limited data available for analysis. Upper
tolerance limit trends for detonation velocity exceeded the specification allowable at 80 months total age at
-65°F and independent of age at +200°F. Installed time trends for detonation velocity had a negative slope
with the lower tolerance limit falling below the specification allowable at 80 months when conditioned to





analysisof the age life of F-14A aircraft ejection seat and canopy jettisoning pyrotechnic components
through the retrieval of installed ordnance from fleet aircraft and subsequent testing in both as-received as
well as accelerated aged conditions. 8 According to Carr, a one-year extension in service life for the F-14A
escape system component_ was planned on the basis of retrieving 10 shipsets of hardware: five to be tested
as-received and five to be tested in an accelerated aged state. Age and service life limits would continue to
be extended until a practical limit was established. The result of the testing described in reference 8 was a
recommendation for a 16-year total and 8-year installed life for the silver-sheathed-HNS SMDC and a
10-year total and 5-year installed life for the lead-sheathed-HNS FCDC. Accelerated aging consisted of
subjecting the items to 28 days of temperature and humidity cycling per MIL-D-21625E, high-altitude
exposure per MIL-D-21625E, vibration, and 20-g shock. A total of 20 SMDC were subjected to thermal
cycling in addition to the environments specified in MIL-D-21625E.
Failures to propagate detonation were experienced on nine SMDCs and four FCDCs during the test
program. Three of the FCDC failures were attributed to pre-existing conditions in the hardware involved in
the failures. Two of the three failures were traced to damaged donor tips supplying the stimulus to the
FCDCs. The third failure was traced to a damaged FCDC donor tip leading to a failure to propagate the
detonation in a side-to-end initiation configuration. The fourth FCDC failure was considered to be
legitimate. Analysis (Ref. 8, page 49) of the failed FCDC construction details revealed a possibility that a
contaminating fluid such as water, cleaning agent, or hydraulic fluid could have entered past the ferrule
joint internal to the FCDC and attacked the lead sheathing. The severity of chemical attack could have
either deteriorated the sheath, contaminated the explosive, and/or degraded the explosive to the point that
detonation transfer would be impeded.
Analysis (Ref. 8, page 60) of the nine SMDC failures showed that one was caused by a manufacturing
defect introduced during inner ferrule swaging. Another failure was attributed to the test fixture
configuration. Two other failures to propagate occurred within the core away from the ferrule. The
remaining five failures occurred within the ferrule assembly. No plausible explanation for the two failures
within the line was presented. Failure to propagate detonation within the inner ferrules was attributed to
the combination of increased HNS-II core density resulting from the swaging operation, initially high
density cores for the lots in question, possibly lower booster inputs, and insensitive explosive lots. The
reliability estimates for the SMDC, excluding the test-fixture induced failure and pre-firing damaged tips,
were found to be 0.9956 and 0.9893, respectively, for Phases III and IV of the test program.
NASA Langley Research Center, Naval Surface Weapons Center (NSWC), and McDonnell Aircraft
Company personnel performed a study of SMDC ("Service Life Evaluation of Rigid Explosive Transfer
Lines") which sought to determine quantitatively the affects of service and age on performance. 9 In the
course of the program, 800 SMDC lines---consisting of 3 different designs, from five different
aircraft--were tested. Certain lines were tested as-received while others were subjected to a repeat of the
thermal qualification tests originally used to certify the SMDC for flight use. The report (page 2) stated
that, as of 1981, the service life limit for SMDC used in the B-1 bomber was 3 years and on the F-16 was
15 years. SMDCs tested in the study were used in the following aircraft: AH-1G, AH-1S, F-14, B-l, and










































OV-102 and OV-103 were removed from storage. The total ages of the hardware from storage were from
approximately 13 to 152/3 years.
Testing of hardware removed from the flight vehicles was broken into two groups. The first group was
subjected to testing in the as-received condition, while the second group was subjected to qualification level
thermal-cycling before destructive test and chemical analysis. All hardware was subjected to visual and x-
radiography inspection upon receipt. The hardware was then subjected to the thermal-cycling (if required).
Certain samples were then dissected to enable a functional performance test to be conducted in parallel with
chemical and physical analysis of the HNS. The thermal cycle for the SMDC, FCDC, and window
assembly MDF was from +350°F to -230°17 for a total of 25 cycles with a soak time of 70 minutes at each
extreme. The thermal cycle for the TBIs consisted of 25 cycles from + 160°F to -65°F with the temperature
stabilized at each temperature for 15 minutes.
Destructive testing of SMDC, FCDC, and MDF from the window cutting assemblies consisted of
measurement of line detonation velocities and tip fragment velocities where booster tips were available.
Swell cap deformation data were recorded during a destructive lot acceptance test (DLAT) for SMDC and
FCDC. The detonation velocities and swell cap data were compared with DLAT data.
Chemical analysis was performed on both flight and storage FCDC and SMDC as received and following
thermal cycling. Flight TBIs were subjected to as-received and thermal-cycle testing prior to chemical
analysis, whereas the inner window MDF removed from OV-102 was only subjected to post thermal-cycle
chemical analysis.
Results from the flight and storage hardware testing, as-received and post thermal-cycle exposure, revealed
no measurable changes resulting from service or age. The thermal cycling did cause an approximately 3%
to 4% reduction in detonation velocity of the FCDC. Due to consistency in chemical purity between as-
received and thermal-cycle exposed units, the change was attributed to a thermally induced reduction in
explosive density (Ref. 10, page 3). The results of this test program were considered to be complementary
to an earlier study the Langley Research Center conducted. 9 Extension of the service life of the components
was considered acceptable based upon the destructive performance data, receiving inspection, and chemical
analysis results.
1.2 Analytical Techniques for Age Life Limit Assessment
Moses' report 2 stated that the Arrhenius equation could be used to determine the age life capabilities of
explosive components given the expected environment to which hardware would be exposed. The validity
of the above analysis is dependent upon the life-cycle being influenced by explosive chemical degradation
and does not consider variable factors such as mechanical cycling, explosive contamination, and
installation dependent corrosion. Accelerated aging of explosive materials is based upon the hypothesis
that an equivalent amount of explosive material degradation can be accomplished in a short period of time
at elevated temperature as would be experienced at a longer period of time at a lower temperature._
Reaction rate kinetics equations must be developed for the explosive in order to calculate the amount of
degradation expected for a given exposure time at a selected temperature.
Methods specifically adopted in reference 11 consisted of exposing materials to combined vacuum and
thermal environments and measuring the weight loss with respect to time. The degradation factor, 0t,
represents the normalized weight loss for the material being tested, and correlation between the degradation
factor and reaction rate is accomplished by numerically expressing t_ such that a plot of ct with respect to




o_ = degradation factor
k = reaction rate (units/sec)
t = time in seconds.
Plotting ln(k) versus 1FF for a number of test points results in a curve whose slope is equivalent to E/R
described in the Arrhenius equation (1). Given the two sets of equations, once the E/R term is known, we
can extrapolate the data to other temperatures over a limited range. Implicit with this approach is the
assumption that the activation energies for the reactions do not change over the temperature range of
interest (Ref. 11, page 3).
Materials aging can be described in terms of thermal-decomposition kinetics which can then be related to
the ballistic properties of interest. Detonation velocity, steel plate dent depth, and output pressure are
properties of interest in performing an age life assessment for crew escape system components. In Rouch's
case, isothermal decomposition data were represented in the form of explosive weight loss as a function of
time, and determination of rate constants and activation energies was dependent upon collection and
analysis of data at different temperatures with respect to time. The measured characteristic is then
expressed as a function, such as shown in equation (2), such that the function is linear with respect to time.
Using experimental test data to establish reaction rates for chemical phenomena was discussed with the
goal of providing chemical kinetic equations for use in predicting long-term reactivity of propellant
systems. _2 The method described consisted of making observations of a given variable with respect to time.
Slope of the curve with respect to time represents the reaction rate, which may or may not vary with time,
depending upon the order of the reaction rate. For example, the plot of the expression
In c = In Co+ kt (3)
with respect to time has the slope of the reaction rate, k (Ref. 12, page 30). In equation (3), c may
represent a concentration of a given chemical reactant and Comay represent the initial concentration of the
reactant. The report points out that the kinetic rate descriptions are not limited to expressions in terms of
concentrations but can be divided into two categories: chemical and physical. Chemical methods of
determining kinetic rate reactions would include measuring a chemical element concentration of one or
more of the reactants or products. Physical methods would involve measuring one or more physical
characteristics which change as the reaction progresses. The report stated that it is theoretically possible
that any physical characteristic could be used to establish a kinetic reaction rate as long as the changes are












A usefulinsightintothedetailsof kinetic-ratexpressiondevelopmentpresentedin thereportisthefact
thatmostreactiontypes,e.g.,first-order,secondorder,etc.,exhibitpseudo-zero-orderrateswhenthe
concentrationof theproductsissmallwhencomparedtothereactantconcentrations)2 This fact is
important to consider when analyzing the data from explosive test articles, since the concentration of
degradation byproducts is typically small when compared to the original explosive concentration.
The JANNAF Structures and Mechanical Behavior Subcommittee proposed using the Arrhenius equation
to develop a prediction of life-cycle limits for solid propellant rocket motors. 13 The analytical technique
flow diagram presented in their report required the following steps:
1. Identify a problem area that would lead to motor failure.
2. Determine an appropriate technique.
3. Measure applicable material properties.
4. Input load conditions.
5. Perform the service life analysis.
6. Verification.
The cycle described above may be repeated many times to develop an accurate service life prediction
methodology. Verification of service life may be accomplished using hardware subjected to accelerated
aging or overtest. Pertinent to this paper is reference 13's discussion devoted to the prediction of propellant
aging characteristics.
Reference 13 emphasized the fact that the reaction rate was a function of both the temperature and type of
reaction occurring. Knowing whether the reaction was zero-, first-, second-, or higher-order would assist in
defining the equation describing the chemical kinetics of degradation. Their report presented an example of
a zero-order reaction in propellant systems which is the degradation of stabilized nitrate esters. Based upon
the stoichiomevic equation for the reaction, the reaction rate would normally depend upon the concentration
of the nitrate ester undergoing the decomposition. The amount of nitrate ester consumed in the reaction,
however, is so small that the reaction is said to be pseudo zero-order. The equation describing such a
reaction is














ester content for the propellant
water content from the atmosphere
products of the hydrolysis reaction
The report emphasized that, since the moisture term, B, was in large supply, the reaction rate was
dependent upon the ester concentration, term A. _3 Since the direct consequence of the hydrolysis reaction is
a degradation of propellant mechanical properties, those properties influenced by the degradation can be
measured over time and used to solve for the reaction rate. The resulting first-order rate equation from





concentrations of the ester at any time
concentrations of the ester at the start of the measurements
The terms A and Ao can be replaced with measured properties of the propellant influenced by the chemical
kinetics. The report presented a typical first-order reaction equation
k*t = ln(P/Po)
where P and Po are physical properties:
P = the property as measured at any aging time
Po = the original measured property
(7)
The reaction rate units are time -1, and the plot of In(P) or ln(P/Po) will be linear with respect to time.
An example of a second-order equation is illustrated using the stoichiometric relationship in equation (5) as
a basis and expressing the rate relationship as
-dA/dt=-dB/dt = k*A*B (8)
with the terms A and B representing concentrations or, if appropriate, two different properties of the
material. The solution to equation (8) is presented (Ref. 13, page 37) as
10
k't= 1/(A-B)* In{B*(A-X)/(A*(B-X))} (9)
withX representingtheamountofeachreactantthathasreactedaftertimet. Theresultingconcentration















3. Performlinearregressionofthedatafor appropriate-orderkineticswithnewplotsof theresults.
4. Analyzedataforevidenceof akineticschangeduringtheagingprocessandseparatethephases
accordingly,treatingeachphasewithitsownsetofkineticsequations.











2.0 Test Program Description
2.1 Test Hardware
We selected hardware for this study from pyrotechnic lots available from JSC ground-bunker storage
which had ages ranging from 29 to 7 years and sheath materials including lead, silver, and aluminum.
HNS was used in all materials included in this study, since the objective of the testing was to characterize
the degradation of Shuttle crew escape system components which contain HNS. Table 2 presents the
11
hardwaretype,manufacturingdate,ageattimeof test,andlot numberof componentsusedin thistest
program.Figure1illustratestheoverheadwindowcrewescapesystemandFigure2showsaschematicof
theoverheadwindowcrewescapesystemexplosivetrain.Figure3illustratesthesidehatchcrewescape
systemandFigure4 showsaschematicoftheexplosivetrain.All of thematerialsusedin thestudywere
manufacturedbyET,Inc.,Fairfield,Califomia.TheFCDCusedin thetestis fromthesameproduction
lotasiscurrentlyinstalledin theShuttlefleetonthesidehatchcrewescapesystem.Figure5illustratesan

















HNS-I in Booster Tip
Aluminum-Sheathed 18.52-
Grains/Foot HNS-II MDF;





Age at Time of Lot Number
Test
10/66 29-1/2 years 146441
1/72 24 years 69148102
10/87 8-1/4 years 7919-8301
10/87 8-1/4 years 0767-8401
8/71 24-1/2 years 6857-73012
Although the materials chosen do not represent each configuration of hardware installed in the crew escape
systems, the observed phenomena in this test program, coupled with results from earlier
studies---particularly references 9 and 10---were assessed to determine applicability to all components
using the HNS.
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Figure 4. Side hatch crew escape system explosive train schematic.
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Figure 6"*. Cross section of an SMDC end fitting.
* Ref. 9, page 18




Figure 7. Mild detonating fuse (MDF).
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Figure 9. Expanding tube assembly (XTA).
2.2 Test Procedure
The test plans and procedures are described in references 15 and 16 and entailed obtaining samples of each
hardware type and cutting 25 one-foot segments, where possible. Table 3 depicts a matrix of the test
sample disposition. The XTA, which contained the 18.52-grains/ft MDF, was not cut into one-foot
segments due to limited materials; instead, the XTA was subjected to the required thermal environment and
then a one-foot segment cut and subjected to chemical analysis. The exposed HNS at the end of each cut
segment was coated with glyptol to protect against moisture intrusion.
Table 3
High-Temperature Exposure Test Matrix
Hardware Control Group A Group B Group C Group D
Description Group 155°F for 155°F for 250°F for 250°F for
30 Days 60 Days 30 Days 60 Days
6-gr/ft MDF 2 samples 5 samples 5 samples 5 samples 5 samples
8-gr/ft MDF 2 samples 5 samples 5 samples 5 samples 5 samples
20-gr/ft LSC 2 samples 5 samples 5 samples 5 samples 5 samples
FCDC 2 samples 5 samples 5 samples 5 samples 5 samples
XTA N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 sample
The test and analysis approach used in this test program was based upon the methodology used in
references 9 and 10, and ET Inc., Fairfield, Ca., detonation velocity measurement standard 25-02-02,
except booster tip fragment velocities were not measured where applicable; instead, swell cap
measurements were taken. Using the referenced techniques for determining reaction rate equations, both at
a given temperature with respect to time and with respect to two temperatures, we used measurement of
performance characteristics and chemical degradation to investigate the order of the reaction and the
appropriate Arrhenius equation constants.
Hardware was dissected in accordance with Table 2 requirements and subjected to the specified
environments. Upon removal from the thermal environments, visual inspection of the hardware, except for
19
theFCDC,revealednoobviouschangesin thefinish,form,or color that would indicate thermal-induced
degradation. The FCDC segments experienced a flow of the polyethylene sheath at the 255°F temperature.
The polyethylene sheath is extruded over the lead sheath of the 2.5-grains/foot MDF. This condition was
noticed when the fiberglass overwrap and polyethylene sheath were cut back in preparation for detonation
velocity testing. Figure 5 illustrates the cross section of a typical FCDC showing the core charge, sheath,
polyethylene sheath, and fiberglass overwrap.
We sent two samples from the FCDC control group---one sample each from the FCDC exposed to the four
environments in Table 3----and the one XTA sample from Group D shown in Table 3 to the NSWC, Indian
Head, Maryland, for chemical analysis. We requested HPLC chemical analysis to measure the content of
HNS and HNBiB in each of the samples. Discussion of the HPLC analytical techniques in determining
purity levels of HNS and HNBiB is found in references 9, 10, 17, and 18.
2.3 Test Results
2.3.1 Destructive Test Firing Results
Figure 10 shows destructive test results for the FCDC, including DLAT results. The data in Figure 10 are
grouped according to environments to which the hardware was exposed. Appendix A contains tabulated
data for the FCDC destructive test results. No DLAT data for FCDC swell cap measurements are
available since the measurements were taken on SMDC test lines receiving the detonation input from the
test FCDC.
Figure 11 shows destructive test results for the 6-grains/foot MDF, including DLAT results. The data in
Figure 11 are grouped according to environments to which the hardware was exposed. Appendix B
contains tabulated data for the FCDC destructive test results.
Figure 12 shows destructive test results for the 8-grains/foot MDF, including DLAT results. The data in
Figure 12 are grouped according to environments to which the hardware was exposed. Appendix C
contains tabulated data for the FCDC destructive test results.
Figure 13 shows destructive test results for the 20-grains/foot LSC, including DLAT results. The data in
Figure 13 are grouped according to environments to which the hardware was exposed. Appendix D
contains tabulated data for the 20-grains/foot LSC destructive test results.
Detonation velocity testing of the XTA was not possible due to the assembled hardware configuration.
Only HPLC analysis of the 18.52-grains/foot MDF HNS was performed. Section 2.3.2 presents the results
of the chemical analysis.
2.3.2 Chemical Analysis Results
Table 4 shows the results of the chemical analysis of the FCDC and 18.52-grains/foot MDF. No analysis
of this type was conducted on the original lots of material and, as a result, no comparisons can be made to
determine the effect aging under normal storage conditions has had on chemical purity. The 1995 analysis
of HNS-II levels within all FCDC samples subjected to environments along with the control group samples
and the single 18.52-grains/foot sample show the materials to be pure, according to the NSWC, Indian
20
Head, Maryland. 19 There were no observed traces of contaminants such as HNBiB or TNT in either the
control group samples or on post thermally conditioned hardware. Given that the only observed peaks on
the chromatographs were from HNS-II, the samples are considered to be pure HNS-II. Temperatures in
the test program have had no apparent affect on the HNS contained within each component. Since the
HNS contained within the 18.52-grains/foot MDF used in this test is from the same HNS lot as is installed
into the FCDC lot, and both materials have been under identical storage conditions, the initial purity levels
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Figure 13. 20-grains/ft LSC detonation velocity versus time and temperature.
Table 4
HPLC Analysis Results for Explosive Components
Subjected to Environmental Exposure
Test Article/ 30 Days 60 Days Control 30 Days 60 Days
Test Group at 155°F at 155°F Group at 255°F at 255°F
FCDC pure HNS pure HNS pure HNS pure HNS pure HNS
18.52
Grains/Foot
NA NA NA NA pure HNS
3.0 Discussion and Analysis of Results
3.1 Linear Regression Analysis of Data
The data will be analyzed in the sequence presented in section 2.3.1. FCDC test results shown in Figure 10
were assessed to determine what reaction order would best describe the observed performance with respect
to time at both temperatures. Linear regression analysis of the data using equations described in equations






155°F data 0.0542 0.0537
255°F data 0.233 0.232
These linear correlation coefficients are not significant and do not allow for confidence to be placed in a
linear equation with a non-zero slope.
For a relationship to have been established with a 0.95 confidence level for the 155°F and 255°F data, the
linear regression coefficients needed to exceed 0.514 and 0.553, respectively. Visual inspection of Figure
10 confirms that there is no slope to the detonation velocity versus time data. The analysis of variance
(ANOVA) of the detonation velocity data resulted in a conclusion that the data cannot reject a claim, with
0.95 confidence, that the means of each data set are equal.
The following values were calculated in the single-factor ANOVA:
Value of Critical Values
Test Statistic, F for F
155°F FCDC test results 0.027 3.88
255°F FCDC test results 0.4748 4.102
As a further guide to interpret the data, the value of F for all lot WAG FCDC firings, including DLAT,
was 2.23 whereas the critical value for F was 3.67. Since the calculated value of F for all firings of lot
WAG FCDC was below the critical F value, the statement that the means of all firing data sets are equal
cannot be rejected with a confidence of 0.95. Insufficient evidence exists to show any trend in the data with
0.95 confidence. The linear regression and variance analysis corroborated the visual inspection zero-slope
of the data in Figure 10.








The zero-order correlation coefficients were below the critical values of 0.33 and 0.35 for the 155°F and
255°F fwings, respectively. Both first-order linear correlation coefficients were below the critical values of
0.330 and 0.35, respectively. Based upon the regression analysis results, insufficient evidence exists to
show a linear relationship between time-at-temperature and detonation velocity with 0.95 confidence.




y(meters/second)= 2.99*X(years)+ 6730(meters/second) (10)




Standard Deviation Range of Data
6-Grains/ft MDF DLAT Data 96.15 meters/second 340 meters/second
Control Group Data Set 19.23 meters/second 83 meters/second
The fact that the control group standard deviation and range was significantly lower than the DLAT data
set's, developed 29 years ago, may point to data acquisition variance in 1966 which has improved using
current technology. The performance of the 6-grains/ft MDF lot 146441 may not have changed in the
29-year period between tests, only the accuracy of the measurements. In either case, the performance of all
hardware in each test group met the performance requirements of the 6-grains/ft MDF.




155°F data 0.266 0.267
255°F data 0.086 0.087
The zero-order and first-order correlation coefficients were below the critical value of 0.433 for both the
155°F and 255°F firings. Insufficient evidence exists to show a linear relationship between time-at-
temperature and detonation velocity for the 8-grains/ft MDF with 0.95 confidence.
Linear regression analysis of the 8-grains/ft MDF DLAT data---gathered in 1972----and the 1995 control
group firings resulted in a linear correlation coefficient of 0.923 while the critical linear correlation
coefficient was 0.349. The relationship established from the regression analysis is
y (meters/second) = 2.87*X(years) + 6700 (meters/second) (11)
Note that each data point recorded during DLAT was 6.7 krn/sec. It is highly improbable that each DLAT
measurement was exactly 6.7 km/sec, but instrumentation accuracy, technique, and planned use of the data
contributed to rounding the number to 6.7. The mean of the control group data is 6766 meters/sec, a
difference of only 66 meters/sec.
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ThefollowingvalueswerecalculatedintheANOVAanalysis:
Value for F for Critical Values
8-grains/ft MDF for F
Firings
155°F test results 0.693 3.63
255°F test results 0.584 3.683
The conclusion drawn from the ANOVA is that the data are insufficient to reject the statement that the
means of the control group and test groups are equal with a confidence of 0.95. Temperature conditioning
of the 8-grains/ft MDF had no measurable effect on detonation velocity.
Linear regression analysis of the 20-grains/ft LSC test data using zero-order and first-order relations
resulted in linear correlation coefficients of 0.166 and 0.044 for the 155°F and 255°F firings, respectively.
The resultant correlation coefficients are below the critical value of 0.532 for , the 155°F and 255°F
fn-ings, respectively. Insufficient evidence exists to show a linear relationshir ueen time-at-temperature
of the 20-grains/ft LSC and detonation velocity with 0.95 confidence.
Linear regression analysis of the DLAT data-----gathered in 1971--and the 19 Jntrol group firings
resulted in a linear correlation coefficient of 0.897, while the critical linear co_relation coefficient was
0.576. The relationship established from the regression analysis is
y (meters/second) = 9.99*X(years) + 6766 (meters/second) (12)
The difference in the mean velocity values between the DLAT and control group samples is
239 meters/second with the DLAT values being lower than the control group's. No plausible explanation
exists for the apparent increase in mean detonation velocity over the 24-year period. The hardware is still
within the performance specification tolerance, since there are no upper limits placed on detonation velocity
for the LSC.
The following values were calculated in the ANOVA analysis:
Value for F for Critical Values
20-grains/ft LSC for F
Firings
155°F test results 0.516 4.25
255°F test results 0.678 4.26
The conclusion drawn from the ANOVA is that the data are insufficient to reject the statement that the
means of the control group and test groups are equal with a confidence of 0.95. Temperature conditioning
of the 20-grains/ft LSC has had no measurable effect on detonation velocity.
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3.2 Worst-Case Predictions of Performance
The analysis in section 3.1 was performed to establish whether or not the data exhibited trends which
would fit zero-, first-, or second-order chemical degradation. Without exception, the elevated temperature
exposure did not alter the detonation velocity of the FCDC, 6-, 8-, and 18.52-grains/ft MDF, and the
20-grains/ft LSC. Statistical analysis of the detonation velocity results proved that the means of each test
sample before and after exposure to environments were identical. The difference between detonation
velocities observed during DLAT and control group firings for the 6- and 8-grains/ft MDF and 20-grains/ft
LSC is significant. Similar increases in detonation velocity were not observed on the FCDC used in this
test program or on SMDC after 16 years of ground storage demonstrated in reference 10. The Navy
reported similar observations of increasing detonation velocity with respect to total age as discussed in the
literature search above. The conclusion from the collection of all firings conducted to date on Shuttle
hardware is that this phenomenon has not been observed and is not corroborated with past detonation
velocity test data or chemical analysis results.
The worst-case assessment using slopes of degradation curves developed through the regression analysis is
that there is no measurable change with respect to time over the temperature ranges investigated. As a
result, the data support an estimate that 20-year service life will not result in degradation of the HNS.
Since no measurable degradation was observed in this test program at temperatures of 155°F and 255°F,
and no measured degradation occurred on flight hardware removed from Space Shuttle Orbiters, _°we
conclude that the HNS-loaded components have not and will not experience thermal-induced degradation in
service.
Assuming, for illustrative purposes, that the 255°F temperature exposure for 60 days resulted in a decrease
from the FCDC average plus 3-sigma DLAT detonation velocity (6467.6 meters/second) to the minimum
specification allowable detonation velocity (6000 meters/second), we can make a worst-case estimate of
service life capability at an 80°F average storage temperature. Using the first-order reaction rate described
in equation (6), the computed k at 255°F is -1.25E-3/days. Applying the reduction factor of 1/2 to the
reaction rate for every 18°F drop in temperature, the reaction rate at 80°F is -1.4E-7/days. Using the
computed reaction rate of -1.4E-7/days, approximately 1,250 years at an average temperature of 80°F
would be required to degrade the FCDC such that the lot would perform with a detonation velocity of
6000 meters/second. We present the above information to demonstrate that the data obtained in this test
program have proven the robust life capabilities of the hardware in a generic sense. Based upon the data
and flight hardware experience, assignment of a 20-year life to all HNS loaded components in the Shuttle
Orbiter is justifiable.
4.0 Conclusions
The Department of Defense's experience with crew escape system components demonstrates the need to
focus on specific applications in assigning service life limits. Unique environments applicable to different
aircraft and missile systems mandate field sampling and surveillance testing to corroborate the design
expectations. Using this methodology, the Space Shuttle Orbiter crew escape system components have, to
a degree, been removed from the flight vehicles and ground storage and tested. Absence of trends in
detonation velocity, swell cap, and chemical purity analysis, justifies the increase in allowable service life
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Detonation Velocity Test Results
(meters/second)
1995 1995 1995 1995
Contrd 30@155F 60@155F 30@250F
2 6450 3 6458 4 6462 5 6449
2 6449 3 6471 4 6458 5 6448
2 6432 3 6484 4 6429 5 6442
3 6463 4 6407 5 6425
3 6438 4 6437



















































6-Grains/ft MDF Lot 146441
Detonation Velocity Test Results
(meters/second)
1995 30 Days@ 60 Days@ 30 Days@ 60 Days @



























6834 6819 6803 6815
6848 6821 6816 6816




























8-Grains/ft MDF Lot 69148102
Detonation Velocity Test Results
(meters/second)
Control 30 Days 60 Days








































20-Grains/ft LSC Lot 68573012
Detonation Velocity Test Results
(meters/second)
Control 30 Days 60 Days
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